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WHO HAS A DEPLETABLE INTEREST IN OIL?
JOHN J. HOLLIS*
Carter Oil Company
The depletion deduction has come to represent a fantastic amount of
money each year.' With such sums at stake it is not surprising that the
courts have been crowded with tax cases involving depletion. The litiga-
tion has involved problems of who gets the deduction, when it may be
taken, how the amount is computed, and what income is subject to de-
pletion. Outside the courts, there is vigorous controversy as to whether
the deduction in its present form should be allowed at all. 2 None of
these problems has been solved to everyone's satisfaction. The purpose of
this article is to analyze how the law as to who gets the deduction in
the oil-" industry has developed. For convenience, the evolution of the legal
rules for determining who benefits from depletion can be divided into
three phases.
During the first phase, beginning in 1909, Congress consistently author-
ized the deduction only to have the Supreme Court thwart its intentions.
Common law rules of estates in land governed the decisions as to who got
the deduction. Congress changed the statute frequently to offset the ad-
verse decisions. Underlying this byplay was the growth in importance
to the economic welfare of both the oil industry and income taxation.
This growth exerted pressure for a realistic solution of the depletion prob-
lem. In 1933 the Supreme Court responded and the development reached
its next stage.
The second phase of development is marked by a fascinating decision.
A new concept, adequate for implementing the intentions of Congress and
adjusting the equities of the depletion deduction, was announced.
During the third phase the new concept is used by the courts, the
administrators, and the taxpayers in dealing with depletion problems. There
is clarification and distortion, hut the new approach becomes firmly fixed
in the law during this period.
The final stage should be the elimination of confusion as to who gets
the deduction for depletion. This point has not yet been reached. "The
characteristics and effects of the new concept are not settled with certainty.
Somewhere in the examination of the evolutionary process, there
*Graduatc, University of Miami School of Law Tax Training Program, 1956; pres-
ently with Carter Oil Company, Tulsa, Oklahoma. This article is not to be considered
the official view of the company with whom the author is associated.
1. A survey prepared by the Secretary of Treasury showed that 350 corporations
deducted as allowable depletion $555,000,000 in 1946 and $839,000,000 in 1947-97
CONC. Rac. 12313 (1951).
2. See Baker and Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence, 64 IHARV.
L. REV. (1951) for skillful presentation of both sides of the question.
3. or convenience, "oil" will be used herein as synonymous with "oil and gas."
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should be the key for successful prediction of the future form of the law.
It may become apparent only in retrospect. The possibility that it can
be detected justifies delving into historical details.
CONGRESS V. COMMoN LAw RULES
The Corporate Tax Act of 19094 provided for a deduction of all loss
sustained during the year-including a reasonable allowance for "deprecia-
tion of property."
The Supreme Court decided, in cases involving the act of 1909, that
no connotation should be attributed to depreciation other than "in its
ordinary and usual sense as understood by business men." The court rec-
ognized that "the revenues derived from working mines result to some
extent in the exhaustion of capital"' and that "there seems to be some
hardships in taxing such receipts as income without some deduction aris-
ing from the fact that the mining property is being continually reduced
by the removal of the minerals."' Nevertheless, the owner-operator and
the owner-lessor of mines were denied any deduction primarily because of
the scope of depreciation.8 In the case of the lessee-operator, the circuit
court felt that the deduction should bc allowed. 9 The cases denying the fee
owners the deduction were distinguished. The difference, according to the
court, was that "when the land is devoted to mining, it is put to only one
of the productive uses of which it is capable." Since the land is left after
the mining is finished the owner suffers no depletion. On the other hand,
the interest of the lessee, as far as lie exploited the minerals, was ex-
hausted each year. When the mining was finished "he did not have left
the principal thing, the land, which he could put to another use." There-
fore, the court reasoned, he was entitled to a deduction for depletion. The
Supreme Court did not agree with this view.10 The circuit court was re-
versed. The reasoning was that the lessee was "in no legal sense a pur-
chaser of the ore in place." He paid so much per ton for the privilege
of removing the ore. This was the only privilege he had under the lease.
With no legal interest in the ore in place lie could not claim depletion.
The Treasury Department had thought the fee owner had a depletable
interest under the Act of 1909 but that the lessee did not.' 1 When Con-
gress specifically provided for an allowance for exhaustion in the case of
4. See. 38, 36 STAT. 11, 112.
5. Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503 (1916).
6. Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
7. Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U.S. 503 (1916).
8. In the Stratton's Independence case the taxpayer owned and operated the
mine; in the Sargent Land Co. case, the taxpayer owned the land and leased the min-
eral rights to others.
9. United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., 242 Fed. 9 (6th Cir. 1917).
10. United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., 247 U.S. 116 (1918).
11. T.O. 1606, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 44-45 (1910); T.O. 1675, 14 Treas.
Dec. Int. Rev. 16, 23 (1911).
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mines in 191312 the Treasury held to this view. The position was con-
firmed by the circuit court in Weiss v. Mohawk Mining Co."8 In this
case the court held that "the statutory reduction for 'depletion' can not be
twice credited, once to the fee owner, and once to the lessee; and that
the exemption belongs of right to the fee owner." For the time being,
this decision fixed technicalitics of title and common law estates in land
as the determinants of who had a depletable interest in solid minerals.
In the 1916 Revenue Act14 Congress provided for a reasonable al-
lowance for the reduction in flow and production in the case of oil and
gas wells. The statute limited the deduction to recovery of cost and did
not say who should receive the deduction. The Treasury Department fol-
lowed its policy of permittiug the deduction to the fee owner only.15 The
lessee was allowed to amortize the cost of his lease.'
In 1918 Congress completely changed the complexion of the deple-
tion deduction for oil and gas. The deduction was not a constitutional
right but rather an act of legislative grace.' 7 The war had proved the im-
portance of new oil reserves to national defense and complaints of oper-
ators had made clear the financial hazards of searching for oil. 8 Con-
gress used its prerogative of establishing an arbitrary allowance for depletion
as a means of encouraging the development of new oil properties. The
Act of 1918'9 provided:
In the case of oil and gas wells discovered by the taxpayer
where the fair market value of the property is materially dispro-
portionate to the cost the depletion allowance shall be fair mar-
ket value of the property at the date of discovery, or within 30
davs thereafter. In the case of leases the deduction allowed by
this paragraph shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor
and lessee.
Depletion for the purpose of income taxation became more than eco-
nomic or geological depletion. The deduction represented a recovery of
cost plus a reward for successful exploration. The fee owner seldom dis-
covered the oil. Normally he did not assume any part of the financial
risk of the search. The lessee either assumed the risk or spread it among
investors. Clearly the intention of Congress was not to limit the deduc-
tion to fee owners.
In 1922 the Treasury Department decided that its policy of denying
12. Sec. II G (b) and See. B, 38 STAT. 166.
13. 264 Fed. 502 (6th Cir. 1920), cert, denied, 254 U.S. 638 (1920).
14. Sec. 12 (a), 29 STAT. 756, 769.
15. T.D. 2447, 19 Treas. Dec. 31 (1917).
16. Ibid.
17. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S, 103 (1916).
18. H. R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918) and hearings before com-
mittee on Ways and Means, 65th Cong. 2d Sess., p. 455, 516-17, 523-28, 530-531.
19. Sec. 214 (a) (10) and See. 234 (a) (9) 40 STAT. 1057, 1067, 1078.
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the deduction of the lessee did not apply to oil leases. In LO 110320 the
solicitor for the Treasury Department distinguished oil and gas from solid
minerals. He avoided overriding the common law rules by reference to
Supreme Court decisions of 189521 and 190022 which held that the sur-
face owner had no title to oil and gas, but only the right to reduce them
to possession. The theory was that oil and gas were migratory and some-
what like wild animals. The exclusive right of the fee owner to seek to
acquire them on his own property was held to be a property right. From
these decisions the solicitor deduced two things:
(1) There was no absolute ownership of oil in place.
(2) Under an oil lease the fee owner conveyed to the lessee the
only interest he had in the oil-the right of extracting it.
Therefore the solicitor submitted that the deduction could
not be limited to fee owners. Indeed, under this reasoning the
depletable interest that remained to the lessor is not clear.
The regulations were accordingly amended to allow the lessee
the full benefit of the depletion deduction. "  In 1925, the
Supreme Court gave the lessee of solid mineral properties the
same benefits. In Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co.2 4 the court
overruled Weiss v. Mohawk Mining Co., holding that the
right of the lessee to reduce the ore to ownership was a prop-
erty right, and as such was a depletable interest under the
statute.
Depletion based on discovery value imposed the tremendous admin-
istrative burden of estimating the market value of existing and newly dis-
covered oil reserves at the date of discovery or thirty days thereafter. 25 In
1926 Congress dropped discovery value and substituted an allowance based
on gross income from the property during the taxable year."" The amount
of the deduction was determined by applying an arbitrary percentage
(271//) to the gross income. The allowance so computed was limited to
50% of net income. Congress felt this provided a simple method of com-
putation, met equitable considerations, and also would encourage invest-
ment in the oil industry. The method became known as percentage deple-
tion. It must be noted that percentage depletion is not limited to recovery
of cost. A deduction for exhaustion of the minerals is pcrrnitcd as long
as there is production. Recovery of cost is incidental; reward for discovery
and production of oil describes the spirit of the deduction. Decisions as
to who has a depletable interest in oil based on notions of estates in land
and recovery of capital would no longer be realistic, if they ever were, as
20. Gum. BULL. 1-2, 128 (1922).
21. Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665 (1895).
22. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
23. T.D. 3386, CuM. BULL. 1-2, 134 (1922).
24. 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
25. S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 17.
26. Sec. 214 (a) (9) and Sec. 234 (a) (8), 44 STAT. 27 (1926).
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long as Congress maintained this attitude. Pcrccntage depletion has been
a part of every revenue act since 1926 with no significant change.27
The Treasury and the Supreme Court had stretched the property law
so that the lessee could receive the benefit Congress intended him to have.
But the financial arrangements for exploiting oil properties seldom stopped
with the simple lessor-owner, lessee-operator situation. The lessee, if not
willing to assume the entire financial risk, would assign the lease to an
operator, reserving an interest in the oil recovered, if any, in the form
of a royalty or an oil payment. 28 Tle risk could also be spread by inducing
investors to contribute to the expense by giving them an interest in the oil
recovered, if any. The lower courts decided who was entitled to depletion
in these situations by reference to rules of property law governing lease
assignments and subleases39  The lessee was often denied the right to
depletion by the courts oil the theory that he had transferred his entire
interest in spite of his reserving a share of the income from the oil. The
depletion deduction was divided between the fee owner and the transferree.
Any income the original lessee received from oil production was considered
part of the consideration for his transfer of the lease and was not subject
to depletion. In Herold v. Commissioner0 the Circuit Court of Appeals
so held. But Judge Dawkins dissented vigorously. He said, "[The Statute]
did not say depiction shall be allowed to those having a particular rela-
tionship to the land, such as owner, lessor or lessee, and, to my mind,
clearly intended that it should apply to anyone having a property right or
interest in the oil which was to be produced-he was entitled to deple-
tion." judge Dawkins understood the clear intent of the statute. He sought
to implement it by a further stretching of "property interests." However,
any elasticity of the established rules as to property interests would always
be offset by the rigidity of the thought processes of jurists who applied
them. The situation demanded penetrating insight and creative genius.
The demand was met by Justice Stone in his decision in Palmer v. Bender.-"
PALMER V. BENDER
Palmer v. Bender has been described as "one of the nearly perfect de-
cisions in the judicial history of federal income tax law."' :2 In this case Jus-
27. Sec. 613 of the 1954 Code provides for percentage depletion. The rate for oil
and gas wells is 27 % of gross income from the properties. '[he limits are not more
than net income from the property and not less than cost depletion.
28. Royalties and oil payments are discussed infra under specific interests in oil.
The royalty interest may be briefly described as a right to a fractional part of the oil
produced for the duration of the operation of the property. The oil payment is the
right to a specific amount of the oil produced or to a specific amount of income from
the oil produced.
29. Pugh v. Commissioner, 49 F. 2d 76 (5th Cir. 1931); Waller v. Commissioner,
40 F. 2d 892 (5th Cir. 1930); Beene v. Commissioner, 40 F. 2d 893 (5th Cir. 1930);
Arthur J. Coyle, 17 B.T.A. 368 (1929); Lena Brown, 24 B.T.A. 30 (19311.
30. 42 F. 2d 942 (5th Sir. 1930).
31. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
32. Baker, The Nature of Depletable Income, 7 TAx L. RF.v. 267 (1952).
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tice Stone created a concept that provided the means for realistic solutions
of depletion problems. This concept is of "an economic interest in the
oil in place." The confusion as to who has a depletable interest in oil
that has persisted since Palmer v. Bender, remains largely because the
courts have been reluctant to rely on the "economic interest" as Justice
Stone described it. In order to establish what Justice Stone meant by an
"economic interest" it will be necessary to quote the decision extensively.
The facts of the case were: The taxpayer was a member of two part-
nerships, each of which acquired oil leases on unproved lands, engaged
in drilling operations which resulted in the discovery of oil. They con-
veyed the leases to another for cash, an oil payment, and an additional
excess royalty of I-8 of the oil produced and saved. The taxpayer sought
to deduct a reasonable allowance for depletion. The Treasury Department
contended that neither the cash, the oil payment nor the royalty was sub-
jec to depletion since the taxpayer had transferred his entire interest and
had no reversionary interest. The circuit court supported the Commis-
sioner's views.33 The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stone said:
The language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at
least, for every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by invest-
ment, any interest in the oil in place, and secures, by any form of
legal relationship, income derived from the extraction of the oil,
to which he must look for a return of his capital.
. ..the lessor's right to a depletion allowance does not de-
pend upon his retention of ownership or any other particular
form of legal interest in the mineral content of the land. It is
enough if by virtue of the leasing transaction, he has retained a
right to share in the oil produced. If so he has an economic in-
terest in the oil, in place, which is depleted by production.
Even though legal ownership of it (oil in place), in a techni-
cal sense, remained in their lessor, they, as lessees, nevertheless ac-
quired an economic interest in it which represented their capital
investment and was subject to depletion under the statute ...
When the two lessees transferred their operating rights to the
two oil companies, whether they became technical sublessors or
not, they retained, by their stipulations for royalties, an economic
interest in the oil, in place, identical with that of a lessor.
As for the term "capital investment," Justice Stone explained, "The
statute makes effective the legislative policy, favoring the discoverer of oil
by valuing his capital investment for the purpose of depletion at the date
of the discovery rather than at its original cost." ht this sense, he de-
scribed the oil in the ground as "a reservoir of capital investment of the
several parties, all of whom, the original lessors, the two partnerships and
their transferees were entitled to share in the oil produced." The Justice,
in support of his reasoning, observed that "the loss or destruction of the
33. 57 F. 2d 32 (5th Cir. 1932).
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oil at any time from the date of the leases until complete extraction would
have resulted in loss to the partnerships."
From these pronouncements three characteristics of the "economic
interest" appear:
(1) It represents capital investment.
(2) It entitles the owner to a share of the oil produced.
(3) It carries with it a portion of the risk involved in exploitation
of the oil in place.
The first characteristic is not easily understood. Capital investment
has come to mean ordinarily the cost basis of the asset. Justice Stone
clearly explains that, when associated with the depletion deduction, cap-
ital investment means more than cost basis. It means cost basis plus the
reward for production of oil that Congress bestowed by statute on the
successful exploiters. "Economic interest" incorporates both these values.
Capital investment in its ordinary usage does not. It would be helpful if
"capital investment" were discarded as descriptive of the increment in
oil that may be recovered tax free under the income tax statute. When
the term is encountered in a discussion of depletion (and it is used in
most decisions) there is the annoying question: Is "capital investment"
used in the sense of cost basis as in the case of depreciation, or is it
used in the sense Justice Stone described it in Palmer v. Bender? A pri-
mary value of the creation of the new concept is lost so long as the use
of the inexact term "capital investment" persists. "Economic interest" in-
eludes capital investment but also the more important depletable element
authorized in the statute-that is, the recovery over and above cost the
statutory deduction for depletion permits. Justice Stone thus provided con-
venient and precise terminology for discussing the depletable interest in oil.
However, one essential element of the economic interest appears in this
first characteristic: Capital investment, meaning a cost basis, is an essential
factor for the creation of an economic interest. Survival of the economic
interest does not depend on the continued existence of the cost basis, nor
is the value of the cost basis important.34 But without an initial capital
investment the economic interest can not come into being."' For other
essential elements of the concept we must look to the other two charac-
teristics.
The second characteristic links the economic interest to production.
This seems inescapable. Economic and geological depletion are both as-
sociated with exhaustion of natural resources by exploitation. The earliest
cases involving depletion for purpose of income taxation held that while
34. Rowan Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942); O'Shaugh-
nessy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 124 F. 2d 33 (10th Cir. 1941); Louisiana Iron & Supply
Co. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1244 (1941).
35. Bankline Oil Co. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 404 (1938).
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proceeds of extractive industries were a result of engaging in business, there
should be an allowance for exhaustion of the resources.-, The resource
is exhausted by production. Therefore if one is to have a depletable in-
terest one must have the right to share in production. As for the reward
element, Congress expressly provides it as an encouragement of production.
That the economic interest must include a portion of the risk is not
so clearly expressed in the decision as could be desired. It may be reason-
ably deduced, however, from Justice Stone's reliance on the fact that
loss of the oil would result in loss to the partnerships. Congress sought to
benefit those who assumed the risks of searching for and producing oil.
To allow the deduction to others is to ignore this intention.
The theory of the economic interest as a basis for determining who
has a depletable interest in oil has been accepted by the courts and the
Internal Revenue Service. 3 Some refinements of its characteristics by
the later decisions must be noted. Determination of whether there has
been an initial capital investment in the oil in place is made under fed-
eral income tax law and not under state law." The right to share in the
proceeds of the oil produced is the same as the right to share in the oil
produceda In Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissione the Supreme Court
said, "Economic interest does not mean title to the oil in place but
the possibility of profit from that economic interest dependent solely upon
the extraction and sale of the oil." \Vhile it can hardly be said that this
clarified the concept of an "economic interest," it does point up the neces-
sity of assuming risk if one is to have an economic interest. It can not ex-
ist unless income from the interest is "dependent solely upon the extrac-
tion and the sale of oil." If the initial capital investment can be recovered
independent of production an economic interest does not exist 1 In
Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co./-' the Supreme Court distinguished an eco-
nomic interest and an economic advantage. The facts were: The Bankline
Oil Company (the taxpayer) had a contract requiring the producer to de-
liver "wet gas" at the casing head of the oil well. The "wet gas" was trans-
ported by pipe lines constructed by the taxpayer to the taxpayer's process-
ing plant. Gasoline was extracted from the "wet gas" and the taxpayer
paid the producer a specified share of the gasoline or a specified share of
the proceeds from sale of the gasoline. The taxpayer claimed depletion
36. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); Von Baumbach v.
Sargent Land Co., 242 U.S.503 (1916); United States v. Biwabik Mining Co., 247 U.S.
116 (1918).
37. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (m)-1l(b) (1953), as amended, I.D. 6096(1954.3k. Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
39. Williams v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 328 (5th Cir. 1936).
40. 326 U.S. 599, 604 (1946).
41. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
42. 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
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on income derived from sale of the gasoline based on the difference in
what he paid for the "wet gas" and its value at the well head. The Su-
preme Court denied the deduction saying:
, . . the phrase economic interest is not to be taken as em-
bracing a mere economic advantage derived from production,
through a contractual relationship with the owner by one who
has no capital investment in the mineral deposit . . . Undoubt-
edly, respondents through the contracts obtained an economic
advantage from production of the gas but that is not sufficient. 4"
Observe how the tests of an economic or depletable interest outlined
in Palmer v. Bender direct the decision:
(1) Taxpayer had no initial investment-construction of the pipe-
line provided a conveyance for the "wet gas", but no invest-
ment in the oil in place.
(2) The taxpayer was a processor, not a producer-he had the
right to share after production. He could not compel produc-
tion:
(3) Having no investment in the oil in place he assumed no risks.
There is an important factor not implicit in the theory that must not
be overlooked-that is, the economic consequence of a decision to the In-
ternal Revenue Service. While the existence or absence of an economic
interest may establish the position of the taxpayer in relation to othe;
taxpayers, it may not be decisive when the impact on the tax structure is
considered. The revenue should be protected from shams that result in
tax avoidance. The Internal Revenue Service should not be burdened with
unworkable rules impossible of administration by rigid adherence to any
theory.44 These considerations can form the basis for sound decisions in-
consistent with the theory of an economic interest. If the courts make
clear that such is the basis for the decision, no violence is done to the
concept of the economic interest. It remains a useful device for the use
of responsible taxpayers in determining their rights to the depletion de-
duction.
In general, the Treasury Department accepts the theory of the eco-
nomic interest in determining who has a depletable interest in minerals.
The Department states:
An economic interest is possessed in every case in which the
taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest in mineral in
place or standing timber and secures by any form of legal rela-
tionship, income from the severance and sale of the mineral or
timber, to which he must look for a return of his capital. 4 5
This seems to embody the same requirements as those justice Stone
43. Ibid at 368.
44. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
45. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (m)-(b) (1953), as amended, 'T.D. 6096(1954).
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thought necessary in Palmer v. Bender. However, the use the Commis-
sioner and the courts have made of the concept can best be evaluated by
examining specific interests in oil in place.
INTERESTS IN THug Oi1. IN PLACE
Under the usual arrangement for exploitation of oil, the fee owner
gives the lessee the right to reduce the oil to possession in return for a
cash payment, called a bonus. The lessee agrees that a certain amount of
the oil produced belongs to the fee owner-either a specified fraction
(usually 1/8), called a royalty; or a specified amount, called an oil pay-
went; or an interest in the net proceeds of the oil produced, called a net
profits interest. The interest of the lessee operator is called the working
interest and bears all the expense of exploitation. The lessee may transfer
this working interest, reserving a fraction of the oil produced (called an
overriding royalty), or an oil payment, or a net profits interest. He may
retain the working interest, but give others an interest in production in
return for investment of capital. The investors receive participating in-
terest, but give others an interest in production in return for investment
of capital. The investors receive participating interests. Thus, the basic
interests that arise from the lease arrangements are:
(1) Royalties
(2) Oil Payments
(3) Net Profits Interest
(4) Working Interest
(5) Participating Interest
The initial cash payment will not be discussed as a separate topic
since it involves, primarily, the problem of what income is depletable. If
the lessor receives a cash payment only, lie has sold his entire interest."
Therefore, before depletion becomes pertinent, the recipient of the cash
must have retained an economic interest in the oil. The existing policy
as 'to depletion of the bonus will be discussed briefly in connection with
specific interests.
Royalties
In general, a royalty, whether payable to the lessor or the lessee, is
an economic interest.4 The usual arrangements from which royalty pay-
ments arise find the recipient with an initial capital investment, a right
to share in production, but no right to receive income except from pro-
46. Badger Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 791 (5th Cir. 1941).
47. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); West v. Commissioner, 150 F. 2d
723 (5th Cit. 1945); Hogan v. Commissioner, 141 F. 2d 92 (5th Cir. 1944); Cullen
v. Commissioner, 118 F. 2d 651 (5th Cir. 1941).
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duction. However, this is not true of a transaction calling for minimum
royalties.
The arrangement for minimum royalties usually takes one of four
forms:
(1) Tbc lessor reserves a fractional interest in oil, but the lessee
must guarantee payment of an annual minimum amount re-
gardless of production. Any excess payment by the lessee
may be offset against future production.
(2) Same as (1) above except the minimum payments can be
avoided by forfeiture of the lease.
(3) The minimum amount must be paid annually but excess
payments can not be recouped.
(4) Same arrangement as (3) above except the minimum pay-
ments can be avoided by forfeiture of the lease.
Are these minimum payments derived from an economic interest?
They are not. The lessor has an initial capital investment-he is entitled
to share in production-but, as regards the minimum payment he has not
assumed the risk incident to exploitation of the oil. He receives this pay-
ment whether or not oil is discovered and whether or not there is pro-
duction after discovery. The payment is a personal obligation of the lessee.
Provisions for recoupment of excess payment from future production only
emphasize the assumption of risk by the lessee. If there is no future
production, the lessee suffers the loss. The lessor suffers no loss if the lease
is forfeited-he, rather, regains the interest hc transferred. The minimum
payment can not qualify as an economic interest as defined in Palmer v.
Bender.
Neither the Treasury Department nor the courts48 agree with the
above views. The position of the Treasury Department appears to be: 49
(1) If the payment of the minimum royalty cannot be avoided by for-
feiture of the lease the income is depletable. If the excess payments can
be recouped, they represent advanced royalties; if the excess payments can
not be recouped, they represent additional consideration for the lease (in-
stallment bonus) . (2) If the payment of the minimum royalty can be
avoided by forfeiture of the lease, then, whether recoupable or not, the
income is dcpletablc after production; before production, if payments can
not be recouped they are not depletablc. It is not clear from the Treas-
ury's pronouncements whether or not payments which are received be-
fore production and can be recouped after production are depletable.
The attitude of the courts has been consistent with the Treasury's
position. In spite of the advent of the theory of the economic interest,
48. Wilson v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935); lHutchinson Coal Co.
v. Burnet, 64 F. 2d 475 (4th Cir. 1933); McFadden v. Commissioner, 2 T.G. 395
(1943); Kleberg v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941).
49. GCN 26526, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 40; U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, 39.23 (m)-10(1953).
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the courts have reasoned from the earlier cases that royalties represented
taxable income from business and not proceeds of the conversion of cap-
ital assets. In Work v. Mosierf0 decided in 1923, Chief Justice Taft classi-
fied the bonus paid an Indian tribe for oil interests as follows:
It was really part of the royalty or lump sum or down pay-
ment. We do not see how it can be classified as anything else.
It was income from the use of the mineral resources of the land.
This classification was adopted by the courts in depletion cases. Both
the bonus and the excess payments under a minimum royalty arrangement
were considered advances against future production. The creation of the.
economic interest in oil as a criterion for depletion did not remove this
unrealistic approach. As a result much of the effectiveness of the con-
cept has been lost.
Consider some of the complications that result because these views
rather than the econonic interest theory prevail. If there is no produc-
tion, depletion taken on the advance payments must be restored to in-
come in the year the lease is abandoned.5' Of course, the fair method
would be to reopen the return of the year the depletion was taken, but
the statute of limitations often prevents this. Therefore, the depletion de-
ducted over the years is pyramided into income in one year. In some cases
this results in disaster to the taxpayer who must take the deduction in the
year of payment or forego it forever. 2-' (At least, the recipient of mini-
mum royalties assumes some risk. However, it is the only risk he does
assume and is artificially created. It is not at all the risk Congress had
in mind to reward.) Apparently any small measure of production will
relieve the obligation to restore the depletion to income.531 Again the eco-
nomic actualities are ignored. The lessor may not claim depletion after
production begins for oil paid for in advance54-- and he must reduce his
depletion base by the amount of the depletion allowed in advance.?5 The
allowance, having lost touch with production, becomes unnecessarily com-
plex. The bonus, in the case of the lessee, is the purchase price of an
economic interest, but the lessor does not receive it in payment for an
economic interest. 0  How this can be is not easy to grasp. In the case
of excess payments of minimum royalties the lessee, at his election, can
expense them in the year of payment."7 Thus an expense to the lessee be-
50. 261 U.S. 352 (1923).
51. Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944).
52. Ibid.
53. Crabb v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 686 (1940).
54. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, 39.23 (m)-10 (1953).
55. Ibid.
56. GCM 22730, 1941-1 Cumt. BULL. 214.
57. See note 54 supra.
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comes depletable income in the hands of the lessor. How this can be is
even more difficult to grasp.
The courts have called depletion of advance payments 'synthetic de-
pletion' and 'anticipatory depletion.-" This is to say that the allowance
of such a deduction can not be justified by consideration of depletion in
any sense. All justification for such allowances, if any ever really existed,
disappeared with acceptance of the theory of the economic interest. How-
ever, in spite of the confusion and complexities that are inevitable in the
present policies, these policies are so firmly supported by precedent and
Treasury pronouncements, they may be expected to plague the depletion
problem throughout the forseeable future.
Oil Payments
An oil payiient is an economic interest50 whether payable out of a
specified percentage of the oil or the proceeds received from the sale of
the oilA0 The right to the oil payment may be acquired by reserving it
when assigning a lease, by purchase or by drilling oil wells.0 ' Postpone-
ment of the right to receive the oil payment until production has reached
a specified level does not prevent its classification as an economic inter-
est 82 The income received from the right to an oil payment is depletable
even though the cost basis of the oil payment has been written off or re-
covered by other methods.63 In other words, if the test of an economic
interest is met, the oil payment is depletable regardless of how acquired,
when paid or how paid.
Two decisions by the Supreme Court involving oil payments are sig-
nificant in the evolution of the economic interest theory. The first, Thomas
v. Perkins,1 involves depletion only indirectly. In this case the other half
of the type transaction that produced Palmer v. Bender is considered. The
question was this: Where an oil lease is assigned and the assignor reserves
an oil payment (an economic interest), is the income from that interest
chargeable to the assignee? The court said, ". . . the owner of an interest
in the deposit is entitled to deduct for depletion of the part producing
his income but may not deduct for depletion of a share belonging to an-
other." Therefore, the income from the assignor's share was not chargeable
to the assignee, As well as clearing tp the position of the assignee, the
court also made clear that state laws as to title to the oil could not effect
58. Driscoll v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 493 (5th Cir. 1945).
59. Palmer v, Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
60. Williams v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 328 (5th Cir. 1936).
61. Lee v. Commissioler, 126 F. 2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942).
62. Jones v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 329 (5th Cir. 19361; Williams v. Commis-
sioner, 82 F. 2d 328 (5th Cir. 1936).
63. Rowan Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942); O'Shaugh-
nessy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 124 F. 2d 33 (10th Cir. 1941).
64. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
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the tax implications of an economic interest. An interesting feature of
Thomas v. Perkins is that Justice Stone dissented. He did not feel that
the presence or absence of an economic interest was relevant as far as the
assignee was concerned. He considered that income from the oil that
was given to the holder of the economic interest represented a part of
the purchase price of the assignor's interest. A strange conclusion for a
justice whose genius produced the concept of an economic interest in
the oil!
The other decision, Anderson v. Helvering,fl presented the same ques-
tion with an added significant fact-the oil payment could be satisfied
from the oil produced or from the sale of the fee of any or all of the
land conveyed. The court distinguished Thomas v. Perkins because an in-
tcrest in the fee as well as an interest in oil production was received. The
taxpayer was not dependent entirely on production of oil for satisfaction
of the deferred payments. The court said:
In the interest of a workable rule, Thomas v. Perkins must not
be extended beyond the situation in which, as a matter of sub-
stance, without regard to formalities of conveyancing, the reserved
payments are to be derived solely from the production of oil and
gas.
The Anderson case brings out clearly that the existence of an economic
interest depends upon an unqualified assumption of risk. The court's
concern for a workable rule should also be noted. This factor could well
influence a future consideration of "carved out oil payments" by the
Supreme Court.
The tax situation created when the holder of an economic interest
"carves out" and sells a smaller interest is the basis for much current
litigation. The smaller interest may either entitle the purchaser to oil
(or income) for the duration of the seller's economic interest or it may
be for a specified amount which will be satisfied before the termination
of the seller's economic interest. In the first instance the interest may be
said to have been carved out vertically and, in the latter case, to have
been carved out horizontally. These carved out interests meet the test
of the economic interest: the purchaser makes an initial capital investment;
lie has a right to share in production; he must look solely to production
of oil for a recovery of his investment. Consistent application of the theory
of the economic interest would entitle the purchaser to depletion. But
if the seller has conveyed an economic interest he is entitled to capital
gains treatment on the proceeds. 0 This result opens the door to tax avoid-
ance by traffic in carved out oil payments, particularly those carved out
horizontally, beyond all reasonable needs for financing the exploitation of
65. 310 U.S. 404 (1940).
66. Caldwell v. Campbel, 218 F. 2d 567 (5th .Cir. 1955).
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oil. The Commissioner tried to block this practice by announcing that
oil payments carved out horizontally-transferred for cash not pledged for
development of the property-were assignments of income by the holder
of the original interests.6 -However, according to the Commissioner, both
the transferor and the transferee were entitled to depletion on the income
each realized from the interest, the implication being that the transferee
received an cconomic interest. This strained reasoning by the Commis-
sioner was not accepted by the courts. The seller was permitted capital
gains treatment as to the proceeds of the sale in several cases. 68 How-
ever, in thc most recent case,"'" The Court of Appeals denied the seller capital
gains treatment because of the "short lived" nature of the carved out
payment. This distinction adds to the uncertainty of the proper tax treat-
nient of the transactions.
It is submitted that the position of the Commissioner as to interests
carved out horizontally is reasonable and could have been supported with-
out distortion of the economic interest theory. The "carving out" oil in-
terest meets the technical requirements of an economic interest. But the
economic realities of the transaction bring into play factors of overriding
importance:
(I) The intention of Congress iii granting the depletion deduction.
(2) The undesirability of opening avenues for tax avoidance by
following a theory to the ultimate of consistency.
(3) The requirement of workable rules in tax administration.
Consider the impact of these considerations on the interests in controversy:
(1) Congress intended the depletion deduction as an encouragement
to those who search for oil and as a reward for production of oil. The
purchaser of the carved out interest does not contribute to the search for
oil since the seller has unrestricted use of the payment. Such a purchaser
has it in his power to arrange a suitable reward for the risk lie assumes
since he can adjust his discount rate. If he is not permitted depletion,
lie can also offset this additional risk by the same method. There is no
necessity for encouraging him. Congress did not intend to encourage or
reward him.
(2) The flienability of "economic interests" is desirable from a finan-
cial and commercial point of view. In general, alienability is not incom-
patible with tax collection, and the Commissioner has shown no tendency
to restrict it. However, there is no foundation for an assumption that the
freedom of alienability accorded legal property interests attaches automat-
ically to "economic interests." The concept was created for reflecting the
67. GCM 23849, 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 66 as clarified by I.T. 4003, 1950-1 CuM.
BULL. 10.
68. Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F. 2d 567 (5th Cir.. 1955)..
69. flawn, CA-5, 3/27/56.. . -
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realities of interests in oil in place for the solution of depletion problems.
This purpose would be defeated if notions of alienability, transferred from
another area, were allowed to open avenues for tax avoidance. The effective
result of allowing capital gains treatment to the seller of oil payments
carved out horizontally would be that the majority of income from oil prop-
erties would be treated as a conversion of capital. The earliest decisions
established that such income is derived from the business of extracting the
mineral?0  It is difficult to see how a reasonable restriction on the alien-
ability of the economic interest, designed to implement the purpose for
which it was created, could be successfully opposed.
(5) That the present situation imposes unworkable rules on the Coin-
missioner is apparent. The decision as to whether a particular payment is
"short lived" or "long lived" would have to be made on the facts of each
particular case. Agreements would be hard to come by. Litigation would
likely be the only solution in most instances.
The Treasury is now sponsoring legislation in order to establish its
position.' It is unfortunate that the Treasury found legislation necessary.
The position of the Department was correct and fully supported by any
careful consideration of all the factors. A large segment of the oil indus-
try appears in accord with the Treasury's views.72 The Supreme Court
would probably rule against the taxpayer if the question of capital gain
on the sale of a carved out interest was presented."- There is always a
risk that the legislation, in its final form, may have more far-reaching re-
sults than either the Commissioner or the taxpayers anticipated.
If, on the transfer of a lease, the tranferor receives a cash payment
and reserves an oil payment but no royalty, the cash proceeds represent
the consideration for the sale of an asset.74 This is the treatment advo-
cated herein for all transactions involving a lease assigned in consideration
of cash with an economic interest reserved by the transferor, including the
royalty. It is difficult to reconcile the conflicting position of the courts
since both a royalty and an oil payment qualify as an economic interest.
In each case, the lessor transfers all other interests. To say that without
the cash payment the lessor would have reserved a larger royalty payment
will not distinguish the transactions. Without the cash payment, a larger
oil payment would have been reserved. To nominate the bonus as advance
royalty, but not an advance as to the oil payment is to distort the economic
70. Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U.S. 503 (1916); Stratton's Inde-
pendence, Ltd. v. Ilowbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
71. HR. 9559, now before the House Ways and Means Committee, if passed
would make the assignment of income rule applicable to all carved out oil and gas
payments after Feb. 27, 1956.
72. See Baker and Griswold, Percentage Depletion-A Correspondence, 64 IlAnv. L.
R~v. 361 (1951).
73. See discussion of Southwestern Exploration Co. case, infra, p. 261.
74. Fleming v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
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consequences of the transactions. If both are economic interests, the cash
payment should be related to both or neither. The realistic view seems to
this writer to be that the bonus represents the proceeds from the sale of
an asset.
Net Profits Interest
Under the net profits arrangements the beneficiary is entitled to re-
ceive a stated percentage of the net profits from the operation of oil prop-
erties. This interest has traveled a rocky road to recognition as an eco-
nolniC interest. Four Supreme Court decisions left some doubt as to com-
plcte acceptance, and the latest decision did not remove all confusion.
I'lie first decision, O'Donnell v. Helvering,75 refused to allow depletion
to the owner of a net profits interest. The taxpayer owned one third of
the stock of San Gabriel Petroleum Company. He sold the stock to Petro-
leumn Midway Company under an agreement that Midway company would
pay the taxpayer one third of the net profits from the oil and gas prop-
erties operations. The court held that the ownership of the oil properties
was in the corporation and that the agreement as to the net profits was a
personal covenant and did not give the taxpayer an interest in the prop-
erties themselves. In a later case, the Court indicated that the decision in
the O'Donnell case was based on the fact that the taxpayer was a stranger
to the lease.' This represents a departure from the economic interest theory.
The clear statement in Palmer v. Bender is that conveyancing formalities
are not material to the determination of an economic interest.
In Elbe Oil Land Development Co. v. Helvering," the taxpayer sold
his interest in certain leases and reserved a net profits interest. The Court
refused to allow the taxpayer the depletion deduction saying, "We are
unable to conclude that the provision for this additional payment quali-
fied ii any wvay the effect of the transaction as an absolute sale or was
other than a personal covenant of the Honolulu company. We conclude
that as respondent disposed of the properties, retaining no investment
therein, it was not entitled to make the deduction claimed for depletion."
The taxpayer was a party to the leasc. The decision seems to hold cate-
gorically that a net profits interest is not an economic interest.
lowever, in Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,78 the Court de-
cided that the lessor who reserved a net profits interest did have an eco-
nomic interest. The court said:
The lessor's economic interest in the oil is no less when their
right is to share a net profit. As in Thomas v. Perkins, . . . their only
75. 303 U.S. 370 (1938).
76. Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
77. 303 U.S. 372 (1938).
78. 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
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source of payment is from the net profit the oil produces . ..
Economic interest does not mean title to the oil in place but the
possibility of profit from that "economic interest."
But in the decision the court also said:
A share of the net profits disassociated from an economic in-
terest does not entitle the taxpayer to depletion. The facts of
each transaction must be appraised to determine whether trans-
feror has made an absolute sale or has retained an economic in-
terest, a capital investment.
If this means only that the tests of Palmer v. Bender must be met before
any interest is an economic interest, then the status of the net profits
interest does not suffer.
In Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner,79 the other face of the
problem was presented. The question was whether the lessee should cap-
italize net profits payments made to his assignor. The Court held he should
not. The reasoning was that the assignor by retaining rights to payment
from the oil retained an economic interest. Thus the assignor was en-
titled to depletion. Therefore, if the assignee were forced to capitalize
the payments he could not recover them through depletion since the al-
lowance as to such receipts belongs to the assignor. Justice Frankfurter
dissented. He complained that the distinction drawn between this case
and the Elbe Oil Land Development Co." case could hardly be held in
mind longer than it takes to state them. It is submitted that the con-
fusion lies not in the theory of the economic interest, but in the failure
of the Court to employ it in the Elbe Oil Land Development Co. case.
The latest decision of the Supreme Court involving depletion, de.
cided February 27, 1956, gives comfort to the holders of net profit in-
terest and to the advocates of the economic interest theory. The facts of
the case, Southwestern Exploration Co. v. Commissioner,' are unusual
and interesting. The California State Lands Act requires that all drilling
and other operations in connection with extracting oil from submerged
state lands be from upland drill sites or filled land. A drilling company, in
order to be given a lease of mineral rights to a particular area by the state,
obtained from the upland owners adjaccnt to the coastal area the neces-
sary easements over their lands. In return it agreed to pay such owners a
percentage of the net profits from extraction of oil, for the use of their
land. It was held that the contribution by the upland owners for the use
of their land for drilling sites in return for a share of the net profits from
production was an investment in the oil in place sufficient to establish au
economic interest. Accordingly, the upland owners, rather than the pro-
78. 326 U.S. 599 (1946).
79. 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
80. See note 77 supra.
81. 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
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ducer, were entitled to depletion on the income received by such ovners.
In arriving at the decision the Court discussed Palmer v. Bender as well
as the decisions discussed earlier. The Court found that in Palmer V. Bender
two factors constituted the requirement for an "economic interest." The
taxpayer must have (1) "acquired by investment, any interest in the oil in
place," and (2) secured, by legal relationship, "income derived from ex,
traction of the oil, to which he must look for a return of his capital." It
was noted that oin each of the prior cases where the taxpayer had been
allowed the deduction for depletion, lie had once had at least a fee or
leasehold in the oil producing properties themselves. "But," the Court said,
"the tax law deals in economic realities, not legal abstractions .... Recog-
nizing that the law of depletion requires an economic rather than a legal
interest in the oil in place, we may proceed to the question of whether
the upland owners had such an economic interest here." The Court found
that they did because the contribution of the easement was a sufficient
investment to establish an economic interest, their income was dependent
entirely on production, and the value of their interest decreased with each
barrel of oil produced. It was not decided that a stranger to the lease
could possess an economic interest. The Court felt that the upland owners
were not disassociated from the lease and decided only "that where, in
the circumstances of this case, a party essential to the drilling for an ex-
traction of the oil had nade an indispensable contribution of the use of
real property adjacent to the oil deposits in return for a share in the net
profits from the production of oil, that party had an economic interest
which entitles him to depletion on the incomc thus received."
This statement should bc noted by purchasers of "carved out" oil
payments. The Court has carefully left the way clear for a holding that
such purchasers do not make a contribution essential to the exploitation
of the oil and therefore do not possess an economic interest. While it is
believed that the Commissioner's position as to these transactions should
be upheld, it would bc undesirable to do so on such a basis. It is diffi-
cult to see how such a decision could avoid casting doubt on the alien-
ability of economic interests in general. Neither the Treasury nor the
taxpayers would benefit by the resulting confusion. The decisoin could
be and should be based, on considerations of the intention of Congress,
tax avoidance, and the requirement of workable rules for the Commis-
sioner. The fundamental facts of income taxation should override the
existence of an economic interest in this situation, but without distortion
of the interest as described in Palmer v. Bender and without restricting
its alienability unnecessarily. If it is found that application of the theory
to the ultimate of consistency permits abuses, the revenue can be pro-
tected without penalizing those whose primary interest is the discovery
and production of oil.
This latest decision confirms the net profits interest as an economic
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interest, apparently puts the economic interest beyond distortion by legal
abstractions, but still leaves doubt as to the welcome of the "strangers."
Working Interests and Participating Interests
Working interests and participating interests will be considered to-
gether since participating interests may be said to be "carved out" of the
working interest.
The owner of the working interest has the obligation to develop and
operate the oil properties. Ordinarily, his capital investment is represent-
ed by the "bonus" he pays the landowner and such part of the cost of
development as must be capitalized. He is entitled to a share of produc-
tion (usually 7/8 of oil produced and saved) and can recover his invest-
ment solely from the production of oil. Working interests meet the test
of an economic interest and the owner is entitled to depletion.12
Participating interests arise from the inability or unwillingness of the
owner of the working interest to assume the entire financial hazard of de-
veloping the property. In order to spread the risk, he may contract with
geologists, engineers, drillers and equipment suppliers to furnish the skill
and material necessary for exploitation of the oil in return for a right to
share in production, carved out of the working interest. Or the lessee, un-
der a similar arrangement, may induce investors to supply funds which
he pledges to use for development of the properties. These participating
interests are economic interests and are distinguishable from the "carved
out" interests previously discussed. The present interests are carved out
of the working interest for the sole purpose of developing the oil property,
The owner of the working interest does not recover any of his capital in-
vestment by the transactions, nor does he realize income, if the proceeds
are used to develop the property. 4 His right to share in oil production
is reduced, but the reservoir of capital investment necessary to recover the
oil is increased. The economic interests represented by the participating
interests are created by this addition to the capital investment and not
by the sale of an economic interest by the owner of the working interest.
Since the owner of the working interest does not receive taxable income
and the participating interests are acquired by services or investment di-
rectly related to production of the oil, the transaction seems not to war-
rant the ciriticisms and restrictions that may attach to "carved out in-
terests" that have neither this tax consequence nor an association with
the exploitation of the oil. Participating interests, whether acquired by
services or investment, represent consideration for contributions to the dis-
covery and development of oil property. The depletion deduction in its
82. Greensboro Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F. 2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1935).
83. Blue Ridge Oil Co., Ltd. v. Rogan, 83 F. 2d 420 (9th Cir. 1936).
84. GCM 22730, 1941-1 CuM. BUL. 214.
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present form is designed to encourage such contributions. The validity of
participating interests as deplctable interests seems safe from aattack.
CONCLUSION
The following conclusions seem justified by an examination of the
development to date of the economic interest theory:
(1) The economic interest theory provides a realistic means of sifting
depletablc interests out of the complex factual situations that often arise
from the financial arrangements of oil exploiters. Economic consequences
to the transactors govern the decision rather than the form of legal rela-
tionship or technicalities of title and estates in land.
(2) While the bonus and minimum royalties do not meet the test
of income derived from an "economic interest," the policy of allowing
depletion as to such payments is so well established by the Commissioner
and the courts that no change is likely in the near future.
(3) The controversy as to the proper treatment of the "carved out
oil payment" may be settled by legislation. If it is not, and the question
is presented to the Supreme Court, the Commissioner's position will be
upheld. The decision will be based on the fact that the purchaser is a
stranger to the lease and has not made an indispensable contribution to
the drilling for and extraction of the oil and therefore has no "economic
interest" in the oil. Since the seller does not transfer an "economic inter-
est" the transaction will be held, in effect, an assignment of income.
(4) The theory of the economic interest, as described in Palmer v.
Bendre, affords a simple and fair method for determining who has a de-
pletable interest in oil. it is subject to abuse by taxpayers who insist that
it should be applied without regard for the economic consequences to the
Treasury Department. The wisdom of this practice is to be doubted. The
risk that corrective legislation may unfavorably alter the long-run tax posi-
tion of all who exploit oil should be weighed against short-run tax advantage.
